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For decades, the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have enjoyed extensive 
and mutually beneficial cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In 2014, 
however, the current U.S.-ROK peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement will expire. 
Soon, the two countries must begin to negotiate a replacement agreement. This new U.S.-
ROK civil nuclear trade accord could serve as an important vehicle for enhancing the 
peaceful nuclear programs of both countries, while simultaneously establishing effective 
nonproliferation conditions and controls to govern such programs.
More Stable Cooperation and More Rigorous Nonproliferation Controls
The U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978 requires that all new peaceful 
nuclear cooperation agreements contain rigorous nonproliferation and assurances on 
exports of U.S. nuclear equipment and nuclear materials, including peaceful, non-
explosive use assurances, international safeguards, physical protection and the right of 
the U.S. to approve various sensitive nuclear activities such as reprocessing. The U.S. has 
since concluded agreements with 20 countries and two international organizations, the 
European Atomic Energy Agency (EURATOM) and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). Each agreement contains these nonproliferation controls, which are far 
more extensive than those contained in the existing U.S.-ROK agreement signed in 1974.
Under the NNPA, after the President submits the proposed text of a new peaceful nuclear 
cooperation agreement to Congress, it will undergo 90 days of continuous session unless 
Congress enacts legislation to disapprove it.  However, if a proposed new peaceful 
nuclear cooperation agreement lacks any of the NNPA requirements, its approval requires 
the enactment of a resolution of approval by both Houses of the U.S. Congress. Given 
these legal and political realities, U.S. negotiators will undoubtedly press for including all 
NNPA-specified conditions in any new peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with the 
ROK. 
A new U.S.-ROK accord could have clear benefits for both countries. It could provide a 
stable basis for peaceful nuclear trade and cooperation for the future, while also 
establishing a model for strict nonproliferation controls that South Korea might include in 
its own bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries.  Unlike the 
existing U.S.-ROK accord, the U.S. intends to make the new agreement reciprocal in 
nature and impose the same conditions on ROK exports of nuclear materials and 
2equipment to the United States as it does on U.S. exports of nuclear supplies to South 
Korea.  In this respect, the agreement offers opportunities to strengthen nonproliferation 
controls on civil nuclear trade and to lessen the one-sided nature of past nuclear 
cooperation between the two countries.
Additionally, the two countries could enhance their contribution to the nonproliferation 
regime by setting forth in the agreement itself—or in a side document—their shared 
views on nonproliferation and their specific intentions and commitments to strengthen 
both civil nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation. This would include pledges to:
! promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in each country and avoid 
hampering, hindering, interfering with, or delaying the peaceful nuclear activities 
of either party;
! support the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);
! strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, including increased financial and 
technical support;
! ensure effective controls on their nuclear exports and assist other countries in 
establishing strong export control systems;
! support restraint in the export of sensitive nuclear technology;
! promote the application of the most effective physical protection techniques;
! conduct R&D on the proliferation-resistance of nuclear fuel cycle activities, 
including both technical and institutional barriers to diversion;
! work together to urge countries to adopt the universal entry into force of the 
Additional Protocol to IAEA safeguards agreements, the conclusion of a 
verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), and the entry into force of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The new agreement could also give formal recognition to, and elevate the status of, the 
Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear Energy Cooperation (JSCNE). In 1980, the U.S. 
and the ROK established the JSCNEC, a bilateral agency that meets formally at least 
once a year. The JSCNEC has become the central forum for exchanging views on a wide 
range of technical and policy matters, including environmental and waste management, 
nuclear energy research and development (R&D), nuclear safety, nuclear fuel cycle 
issues, safeguards, the NPT, nuclear export controls, nuclear supply assurances, regional 
proliferation concerns, nuclear smuggling, and nuclear cooperation with other countries. 
Differences Over the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Most likely to complicate the negotiation of a new U.S.-ROK peaceful nuclear 
cooperation agreement is the implementation of a U.S. right to consent to South Korea’s 
reprocessing of used nuclear fuel from its nuclear program.1
                                                
1 There have also been reports that the ROK may also consider the acquisition of enrichment technology, a 
step that could also conflict with U.S. nonproliferation policy. See “Seoul considering options to improve 
energy efficiency” Korean Herald, July 8, 2009.
3About two-thirds of South Korea’s used power reactor fuel has been produced from
nuclear material supplied under the 1974 U.S.-ROK peaceful nuclear cooperation 
agreement. This existing agreement provides that nuclear material supplied to South 
Korea may be reprocessed only in facilities acceptable to both parties upon a joint 
determination that IAEA safeguards may be effectively applied.  With the 1978 NNPA, 
U.S. nonproliferation legislation now requires that new agreements contain an expanded 
U.S. consent right to include not only nuclear material supplied by the U.S., but also all 
nuclear material that has been used in a U.S.-supplied reactor. To date, the U.S. has not 
consented to any reprocessing—or to the alteration in form of content—of U.S.-supplied 
used nuclear fuel in Korea.
South Korea’s used nuclear fuel problem. South Korea is heavily dependent on nuclear 
power; by 2030, it will account for 59 percent of South Korean electricity generation. 
However, South Korea faces serious challenges in managing and storing its used nuclear 
fuel.2
The lack of adequate used fuel storage capacity could lead to a shut down of the existing 
reactors and be one of the biggest stumbling blocks for South Korea’s plans to generate 
more nuclear power.3 In the longer term, the ROK must find a place to dispose of its 
high-level nuclear waste. In early 2009, the government established the Korea 
Radioactive Waste Management Co. Ltd (KRWM) as an umbrella organization designed 
to resolve South Korea's waste management disposition—and to forge a national 
consensus on high-level wastes.   However, the ROK has not yet raised the issue of site 
selection for the disposal of high-level waste, an issue that will undoubtedly spark 
considerable controversy. In 2007, the government began construction on South Korea’s 
first repository for mid- and low-level nuclear waste, but only after 20 years of highly 
contentious debate. The government promised to donate USD$300 million to the local 
community in Gyungjoo, the host city of the final repository, and to financially support 
the community with USD$4 billion.
South Korea currently has 20 reactors in operation, six under construction, and plans to 
increase nuclear capacity to 38 reactors by 2030. These reactors will produce more than 
100,000 tons of used nuclear fuel by 2100.  South Korea wants to establish a capability to 
minimize the accumulation of used nuclear fuel discharged from its nuclear power plants 
and, potentially, to recycle it by using the transuranic elements in fast reactors.
South Korea must find both short and long-term solutions to managing the back end of its 
nuclear fuel cycle.  In the short-term, the only realistic answer is the interim storage of 
spent fuel either at reactors at a central storage facility, or at multiple, regional facilities.  
                                                
2 At the end of 2007, South Korea had a combined storage capacity of 12,561 tons of used nuclear fuel that 
is discharged from its 20 nuclear reactors currently in operation.  The total spent fuel inventory stored at 
reactor sites in the ROK now exceeds 10,000 metric tons. Officials at Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co.
KHNP recently revealed that the spent fuel pools for Korea’s 16 pressurized power reactors (PWRs) at 
three existing sites will be full as of 2016.  ROK aims to forge a stakeholder consensus by 2016 on how it 
will manage its growing inventory of spent power reactor fuel.
3 “Lack of Storage Capacity Clouds Nuclear Power Plan,’ Korea Times, December 2, 2007.
4However, these alternatives are likely to encounter strong public opposition. For the long-
term, some in the ROK government and the R&D community believe that a certain form 
of reprocessing, referred to as pyroprocessing, is the most sensible solution to managing 
South Korea’s nuclear waste.  The final disposal of used nuclear fuel, they believe, would 
be a formidable task: South Korea’s population density is among the world’s highest and 
its present infrastructure makes impossible the road transport of used nuclear fuel, as its 
transport canister weighs more than 110 tons. For the South Koreans, these factors put a 
premium on minimizing nuclear waste.
Pyroprocessing and Proliferation Risks.  In negotiating a new agreement with the 
United States, South Korea will likely aim to obtain advance, long-term U.S. consent on 
both reprocessing or pyroprocessing of used nuclear fuel, subject to the agreement, and 
U.S. consent to South Korea’s use of recovered plutonium and other transuranics in fast 
reactors.
However, because reprocessing technology poses several proliferation risks, the U.S. has 
long approached the reprocessing issue with great caution. Classic PUREX reprocessing 
separates plutonium from all fission products. This separated plutonium may be used as 
fuel in civil nuclear reactors, but it is also directly usable in nuclear weapons. A state, 
which possesses such material, could abrogate its nonproliferation commitments and 
produce a nuclear weapon within a short period of time.  Reprocessing plants are also 
challenging and costly to safeguard, while separated plutonium offers a tempting target to 
non-state actors.
International attention towards the proliferation risks posed by reprocessing has focused 
on two different strategies. The first strategy, the so-called once-through fuel cycle, 
eschews reprocessing and disposes of used nuclear fuel as waste. Proponents of this 
approach have argued that reprocessing is more costly than the once-through fuel cycle 
strategy and presents far greater proliferation risks. The United States has long promoted 
this strategy, dating back to the 1970s Ford and Carter administrations. The second 
strategy focuses on the development of new and increased “proliferation-resistant” 
technologies, which do not separate pure plutonium. As part of its Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership (GNEP), the George W. Bush Administration placed considerable emphasis 
on “proliferation-resistant” fuel cycle development. The U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) has therefore studied a range of reprocessing technologies, virtually all of which 
are in the research stage and have not demonstrated commercial viability. 
One of these reprocessing technologies is pyroprocessing, the technology in which South 
Korea is particularly interested.  The U.S. has engaged ROK scientists on joint 
pyroprocessing experiments involving used nuclear fuel at U.S. laboratories. However, 
the U.S. has agreed to such cooperation on the R&D level only on a case-by-case basis. 
In addition, South Korea scientists have been restricted to using natural uranium, which 
does not contain plutonium.4  The United States has also not allowed any “hot” 
                                                
4 The plutonium product of pyroprocessing is not pure but is mixed with uranium, some rare-earth fission 
products (notably cerium-144), and the other transuranic elements, namely americium, curium, and 
neptunium.
5processing of used nuclear fuel subject to the existing U.S.-ROK nuclear cooperation 
agreement.
Pyroprocessing has been under development in the DOE’s Argonne National Laboratory. 
In 2005, South Korea built a laboratory-scale Advanced Conditioning Processing Facility 
(ACPF) in the Irradiated Material Examination Facility of the Korea Atomic Energy 
Research Institute (KAERI).   On December 23, 2007, the Korean Ministry of Science 
and Technology announced a civil nuclear energy plan that aims to build a functioning, 
next-generation fast reactor and a pyroprocessing—or pyrorecycling—fuel cycle by 
2028. The plan is to first begin construction of a pilot pyroprocessing facility by 2012, 
which will be completed by 2016.  The Ministry also envisages a semi-commercial 
facility in place by 2025.5
Observers both within and outside the U.S. government have argued that pyroprocessing 
and pyrorecycling is not “proliferation-resistant” because technology separates most 
fission products from the plutonium, therefore removing the major technical barriers to 
its use in nuclear weapons.  In addition, the draft Nonproliferation Impact Assessment 
(NPIA) of the GNEP Programmatic Alternatives, which was developed by the DOE, 
reached the preliminary conclusion that the candidate reprocessing technologies under 
study, including pyroprocessing, suggest only modest improvements in reducing 
proliferation risk over existing PUREX technologies, and these would reduce the risks 
that non-state actors, not states, would be able to gain access to the plutonium.6
Over several decades, U.S. policy toward reprocessing in other countries has exhibited a 
striking continuity of approach.  The U.S. has granted consent to reprocessing only in 
countries that already have advanced nuclear programs, including reprocessing and 
enrichment plants, and excellent nonproliferation credentials. Also, the U.S. grants 
consent to countries with no proliferation risk or are located in areas of only limited 
proliferation danger. To date, the U.S. has approved the reprocessing of U.S.-obligated 
used nuclear fuel only in EURATOM and Japan—and has agreed to consent to such 
reprocessing in a future Indian reprocessing facility.  For all other countries, U.S. 
administrations from President Gerald Ford to President George W. Bush have sought to 
restrict the spread of reprocessing and have declined to give consent to reprocessing of 
U.S.-obligated spent fuel. Recently, the U.S. Congress underlined its support for this 
policy in the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation 
                                                
5Lee Joon-seung, “S. Korea's aims to develop a functioning fast reactor, advanced fuel cycle by 2028,” Yonhap News, 
December 23, 2007. 
6 With respect to pyroprocessing, the NPIA stated that the compact and batch nature of pyroprocesses 
favors co-locating a fuel recycle facility with a group of advanced burner reactors thus reducing the need 
for a large centralized processing facility and possibly reducing transportation of separated transuranic 
material, including the plutonium, and the attendant physical protection concerns. Pyroprocessing remains 
an experimental process not yet deployed on a production scale. Misuse could take longer than estimated if 
there are complications in modifying or scaling up the process. On the other hand, development of new 
pyroprocessing methods could allow for misuse scenarios that take less time to complete.  It also states that 
pyroprocessing poses challenges for material accountancy and would require significant safeguards 
technology and system development before effective safeguards systems could be implemented even for 
engineering-scale facilities. An effective safeguards approach for such facilities should be designed to 
detect both misuse of the facility and diversion of nuclear material.
6Enhancement Act of 2008, which required the President to certify that it is, “the policy of 
the United States to work with members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
individually and collectively, to agree to further restrict the transfers of equipment and 
technology related to the enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel”
(Section 104 (a)).
The Obama Administration, the U.S.-ROK Peaceful Nuclear Agreement, and 
Reprocessing.  The Obama Administration’s approach to reprocessing in South Korea 
was addressed in written answers that Ellen Tauscher provided to Senator Richard Lugar, 
ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in connection with 
her nomination hearings for the position of Under Secretary of State for Arms Control 
and International Security.  Senator Lugar asked:
“Does the Administration contemplate any changes in existing nuclear 
cooperation agreements, in particular those with Taiwan and the Republic of 
South Korea, to allow reprocessing of US-origin materials in those nations?”
Tauscher’s written answer was:
“Pursuant to the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, all 
U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements with partner countries require that the 
United States give its consent to reprocessing of spent fuel containing U.S.-origin 
nuclear material by those countries. The agreements with EURATOM, India and 
Japan provide programmatic consent7 for reprocessing within the European 
Union, India and Japan. The Administration does not believe that such 
programmatic consent to reprocessing is necessarily appropriate (highlighting 
added for emphasis) in other cases, including Taiwan and the Republic of Korea.”
Tauscher’s use of the words “necessarily appropriate” in reference to the possibility of 
U.S. programmatic consent to reprocessing is ambiguous. It would appear to leave open, 
at least, the possibility of such U.S. approval of reprocessing in both places. However, 
Senator Lugar also asked:
“Do you believe that an agreement that allowed any form of reprocessing to take 
place in South Korea would violate the 1992 Joint Declaration, in particular its 
clear statement that “The South and the North shall not possess nuclear 
reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities”?”
Tauscher’s answer appears to close the door to the reprocessing of U.S.-obligated used 
nuclear fuel in South Korea:
“I believe that the existence of a reprocessing plant in the Republic of
                                                
7 Programmatic consent means advance, long-term U.S. consent to reprocessing and the use of plutonium 
in the peaceful nuclear programs in these countries under specified safeguards and physical protection 
measures. 
7Korea would be inconsistent with the commitments made in the 1992 Joint 
Declaration.”8
Washington has regarded the 1992 North and South Korean Joint Declaration on the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in which both parties agreed to forego 
possession of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, as a key component of realizing 
nuclear stability on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. has feared that any South Korean 
pyroprocessing program would undermine the 1992 North-South denuclearization
agreement at a sensitive time in U.S. efforts to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program. 
Points of Contention: the United States.  The U.S. will find it difficult to consent to 
pyroprocessing in Korea for a number of reasons:
1. As noted above, it will be extremely difficult for the U.S. to consent to any kind 
of reprocessing on the Korean Peninsula, if Washington perceives that such a 
decision would jeopardize the satisfactory resolution of the nuclear issue in the 
North, including a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula.
2. Finding a rationale for making an exception for South Korea to its long-standing 
policy of preventing the spread of sensitive nuclear facilities will be challenging. 
To date, the only exceptions have been Japan and EURATOM and, more recently, 
a promise to give India advance consent to reprocessing.
3. The ROK differs from Japan and EURATOM in that it has neither built nor 
operated reprocessing facilities and is, therefore, not in a position to argue that its 
existing programs should be grandfathered like those in Japan and EURATOM.
4. Most members of the arms control and nonproliferation community in the United 
States will oppose any kind of reprocessing and will lobby the Executive Branch 
and the Congress against any arrangements allowing reprocessing or 
pyroprocessing in South Korea.
5. A growing international consensus has emerged favoring a halt to the further 
spread of national enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.9
                                                
8 Pre-Hearing Questions for the Record, Senator Richard Lugar Nomination of Helen M. Tauscher to be 
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.
9 For example, Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, Director General of the IAEA, has urged countries to agree to a 
moratorium on the construction of new enrichment and reprocessing facilities in return for their receiving 
guarantees of delivery of nuclear fuel for peaceful production of electricity. He has also advocated placing 
all enrichment and reprocessing plants under some form of international auspices or control.  In December 
2005 the High-Level UN Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change issued a report that called for a limited 
moratorium on the construction of any further enrichment or reprocessing facilities, with a commitment to 
the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply of fissile materials by the current suppliers at market 
rates. The members of the Group of Eight (G-8) have also issued statements in which they said, “it is 
important to develop and implement mechanisms assuring access to nuclear fuel related services to states as 
an alternative to pursuing enrichment and reprocessing activities.” 
86. The NSG has been examining ways to strengthen its guidelines on transferring 
enrichment and reprocessing technologies.
7. Acceptance of South Korean pursuit of pyroprocessing would not only be 
controversial in America, but may also raise regional and global nonproliferation 
concerns.
Points of Contention: South Korea.  As mentioned earlier, the ROK will press the 
United States hard for advance, long-term consent to reprocess—or pyroprocess–used 
nuclear fuel subject to the bilateral agreement for a number of their own reasons.  
1. As a sovereign state and as a party to the NPT, the ROK will argue that it has the 
right to engage in reprocessing as long as it is abiding by its NPT obligations.  
Seoul will point to the wording of Article IV of the NPT, which negotiators will 
cite as the legal basis in resisting any notion that the ROK should be denied a 
reprocessing or pyroprocessing capability. The Article states, “Nothing in this 
Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the 
Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this 
Treaty.” 
2. North Korean reprocessing, and its conduct of a nuclear test, both constitute a 
violation of the two countries’ 1992 denuclearization agreement. This, they will 
argue, renders null and void the South Korean commitment in that agreement not 
to possess enrichment or reprocessing capabilities.
3. South Korea finds it discriminatory that the United States has given India, Japan 
and EURATOM advance, long-term consent to reprocessing and to the use of 
plutonium while refusing the ROK the same treatment, even though South Korea 
has a major nuclear power and R&D program.  Seoul sees the U.S.-Japan civil 
nuclear cooperation agreement, in particular, as the benchmark for a new U.S.-
ROK agreement.
4. South Koreans disagree with their U.S. counterparts about reprocessing and have 
asserted that the pyroprocessing technology they have developed is not 
reprocessing because no plutonium is separated from other transuranics when they 
are separated from uranium. South Koreans also argue that the technology is 
proliferation resistant10 and that any concerns about their pyroprocessing R&D 
program can be put to rest by effective safeguards.11
                                                
10 Daniel Horner and Mark Hibbs, ““US debating whether pyroprocessing qualifies as reprocessing for 
Korea” Nuclear Fuel, June 2, 2008
11 Mark Hibbs, “Pyroprocessing proliferation issues can be solved, Korean experts say,” Nuclear Fuel, June 
13, 2008.
95. The United States cannot deny the ROK consent to reprocessing after it has given 
preferential treatment to India, a non-NPT party.12  In its recently concluded 
peaceful nuclear cooperation with India, the U.S. has promised to advance, long-
term consent to reprocessing in India.  Specifically, paragraphs iii and iv of 
Article 6 of that agreement provides that:
“...the Parties grant each other consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or 
content nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear 
material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear 
material, non-nuclear material, or equipment so transferred. To bring these rights 
into effect, India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to 
reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards and the Parties 
will agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing or 
other alteration in form or content will take place in this new facility. 
Consultations on arrangements and procedures will begin within six months of a 
request by either Party and will be concluded within one year.”
The U.S. and India have already begun consultations on the arrangements and 
procedures for safeguarding the proposed Indian reprocessing plant, with the 
intention of completing them by August 2010, as required by the terms of the 
agreement. The U.S.-Indian agreement has given the South Koreans the argument 
that the U.S. should be prepared to grant the ROK the same treatment with respect 
to pyroprocessing of U.S.-obligated spent fuel as it has accorded India with 
respect to reprocessing. The ROK will argue that they have assumed all the 
obligations and burdens of an NPT party whereas India has not and that they have 
a close alliance and a security treaty with the United States, which India does not.
In addition, the Korean Peninsula is a region that is no more politically unstable 
than South Asia.
Options for the United States and South Korea
Given the positions that the U.S. and ROK have on reprocessing and 
pyroprocessing/recycling, is a resolution of this issue possible? Below are several 
options. 
Just Say ‘No”.  The U.S. could adopt the position it has taken with the vast majority of 
its cooperating partners and simply decline to give advance, long-term consent to 
pyroprocessing in South Korea. Under this option, the U.S. could offer to explore with 
the ROK options on interim storage of used nuclear fuel either in the ROK or offshore.  
The U.S. could then consider any future requests to pyroprocess U.S.-obligated used 
                                                
12 Until recently the United States required that all non-nuclear-weapon states (India is a non-nuclear-
weapon state under international law) accept comprehensive safeguards as a condition of significant 
nuclear cooperation.  The Bush Administration departed significantly from this principle when it persuaded 
the U.S. Congress to change the U.S. Atomic Energy Act and the members of the NSG to revise its 
international guidelines in order to enable nuclear cooperation with India by exempting India from the 
requirement for accepting comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
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nuclear fuel on a case-by-case basis.   South Korea would then have to store its used fuel 
indefinitely and possibly consider disposing of it as waste. This stance would be fully 
consistent with long-standing U.S. policy and would be supportive of Washington’s 
efforts to prevent the spread of reprocessing capabilities.  It would encounter no 
opposition from the nonproliferation, arms control and environmental communities in the 
United States and would most likely receive a positive reception in the U.S. Congress. 
The South Koreans, however, would find this outcome highly unsatisfactory, particularly 
in light of the fact that the U.S. had been cooperating with the ROK on research into 
pyroprocessing and thereby had encouraged Seoul to pursue this technology—not to 
mention that the U.S. has given consent to other countries with major nuclear programs.  
South Korea would find it difficult to proceed with its plans to develop and deploy 
commercial pyroprocessing technology in the face of an uncertain U.S. response to a 
ROK request to future pyroprocessing or to make plans for the long-term disposition of 
its used nuclear fuel.
International Storage or Disposal Facilities. South Korea could explore the option of 
establishing an international (or regional) storage or waste disposal facility. While this 
idea has generated a great deal of support and enthusiasm for many years, and despite the 
potential value of such a facility, no country has yet to come forward to agree to host one. 
For the foreseeable future, this is a not a realistic option for South Korea or for any other 
country.
Domestic Storage. One short-term possibility is to establish a dry cask storage at reactor 
sites or to construct central storage, or regional storage, sites. South Korea is likely to 
face some political obstacles with this approach, but interim dry cask storage would 
provide near-term and mid-term relief to the utility industry and would not raise any 
nonproliferation concerns.  However, this does not address the long-term problem.
Reprocessing abroad. Another option would be for the U.S. to permit the ROK to 
transfer some or all U.S.-obligated spent fuel to Europe for reprocessing. There are 
indications that the U.S. government might be willing to take this approach, as long as 
there is no return of the separated plutonium to South Korea. However, South Korea 
would view such a U.S. position as severely discriminatory because the U.S. has granted 
Japan consent to reprocessing and the use of plutonium in Japanese nuclear facilities, this 
includes the return of Japanese plutonium recovered from overseas reprocessing.13 In 
addition, without the option of returning the recovered plutonium to South Korea, Korean 
utilities would have to pay for the indefinite storage of their recovered plutonium in 
Europe. Since there is no real market for this material, they are unlikely to find 
acceptable customers for such plutonium.
Pyroprocessing. Secretary Tauscher’s response to Senator Lugar’s question that “the 
existence of a reprocessing plant in the Republic of Korea would be inconsistent with the 
commitments made in the 1992 Joint Declaration” would seem to allow the possibility of 
U.S. consent to reprocessing in the ROK, but only under very limited circumstances, if at 
                                                
13 Mark Hibbs, “US might permit offshore reprocessing but not return of South Korean plutonium,” 
Nuclear Fuel, September 21, 2009.
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all. At a minimum, it is difficult to imagine that the United States would agree to South 
Korean pyroprocessing until the North Korean nuclear issue reaches a satisfactory 
resolution. The United States has attached considerable importance to the ROK-DPRK 
joint declaration of 1992. Moreover, all of the countries involved in six-party talks would 
likely have to accept the idea of South Korean pyroprocessing. A consensus on this 
question may be difficult to achieve since it is questionable whether the DPRK would 
agree to forego sensitive nuclear activities unless the ROK agreed to the same kind of 
restraint. If the North Korean problem were to be satisfactorily resolved, the U.S. might 
be prepared to agree to some form of pyroprocessing under strict nonproliferation 
conditions. There are a few possibilities under which pyroprocessing could be allowed, as 
listed below.
1. The 1992 North Korean-South Korean declaration could be replaced in the future 
by some broader understanding that contemplates some form of reprocessing and 
enrichment under special controls, restraints and conditions on the Korean 
Peninsula. Under the present circumstances, however, such a development seems 
highly uncertain.
2. The United States could also determine that pyroprocessing is not, in fact, 
reprocessing. At the moment, this question is still under review by the U.S. 
government, but it is fair to say that the U.S. generally regards pyroprocessing as 
reprocessing since this technology has been developed to the point where the 
plutonium product is quite pure.  However, there may be some room to maneuver 
for electro-reduction as opposed to electro-refining, since the former leaves a 
product that contains mostly uranium and some fission products and that, 
therefore, is less proliferation-prone than electro-refining.
3. The U.S. could make a commitment to approve long-term pyroprocessing in 
South Korea along the lines similar to the arrangements that the U.S. has made 
with India and Japan.  In other words, the U.S. could agree in principle to consent 
to pyroprocessing and pyrorecycling of U.S.-obligated nuclear fuel in a facility
that South Korea might construct in the future—provided that it was designed, 
managed, and operated under mutually acceptable nonproliferation conditions and 
met agreed safeguards criteria.14 The U.S. would grant such consent only when it 
is satisfied that pyroprocessing/recycling in South Korea would not exacerbate the 
risk of proliferation on the Korean Peninsula.
4. The ROK and the U.S. could make a joint commitment to work with each other 
on the development of proliferation-resistant pyroprocessing technology; and they 
could both work with the IAEA on related advanced safeguards techniques.  The 
ROK R&D facility could become a test bed for the development of such 
pyroprocessing and safeguards technologies. Simultaneously, the facility could be 
                                                
14 In the 1988 U.S.-Japan peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, the U.S. agreed to the future 
reprocessing of U.S.-obligated spent fuel at the then-yet-to-be built Rokkasho facility, provided that Japan 
agreed to allow the IAEA to apply safeguards in accordance with a safeguards concept that had been agreed 
to in advance by the U.S. and Japan.
12
utilized to design high levels of safeguards into new nuclear systems and facilities 
from the outset, including both the inherent technical characteristics of the process 
and the safeguards measures to be taken. Joint U.S.-ROK R&D would be aimed at 
designing a commercial facility that would restrict the ability to adjust the 
technical parameters to produce separated plutonium, in addition to developing 
safeguards systems that could be designed to provide timely detection of any 
alteration of parameters. The two states could agree that ROK would move 
toward the establishment of a commercial capability only on a step-by-step 
basis—and only when both the U.S. and the ROK have jointly agreed that 
pyroprocessing in the ROK is sufficiently “proliferation-resistant” and may be 
effectively safeguarded.  One element of this step-by-step approach would be to 
continue to restrict “hot” processing to the United States until the two sides reach 
an agreement on proliferation-resistance and safeguards’ effectiveness, at which 
point some “hot” processing R&D would take place in the ROK.
5. Seoul could take additional steps to make South Korean pyroprocessing activities 
more palatable to Washington. For example, the ROK could make a legally 
binding commitment in the new ROK-U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation 
agreement to refrain from possessing a PUREX reprocessing capability. This 
would make it easier to obtain a purer and more easily handled product than one 
from a pyroprocessing plant, as the pyroprocessing facility would contain a 
mixture of plutonium, uranium and fission products and would require substantial 
further reprocessing.  Seoul could also agree to co-locate all pyroprocessing, fuel 
fabrication, and advanced burner reactors as part of the future South Korean
nuclear program, thus minimizing the risk of theft.15 Whether the United States 
would agree to this kind of arrangement, however, is questionable.  It would 
conflict with long-standing U.S. opposition to the spread of reprocessing and the 
use of plutonium, and it is questionable whether any pyroprocessing can be made 
to be sufficiently proliferation-resistant to make the plutonium product unusable 
in nuclear weapons. Also, this kind of arrangement would encounter serious 
opposition in the United States nonproliferation community and the U.S. 
Congress.
6. The U.S. and South Korea could consider a joint venture or multinational entity, 
which would establish strengthened barriers to proliferation and avoid national 
control of this sensitive technology.  Seoul could commit to making any 
pyroprocessing facility in South Korea a joint venture that would entail U.S. 
and/or multinational participation in the management and/or operation of the 
facility. The enterprise could possibly involve the IAEA in the policy-making or 
management of the plant.  Given the potential political, economic and 
                                                
15 The Nonproliferation Impact Assessment of GNEP Alternatives stated that, “The compact and batch 
nature of pyroprocesses favors co-locating a fuel recycle facility with a group of advanced burner reactors 
thus reducing the need for a large centralized processing facility and possibly reducing transportation of 
separated transuranic material, including the plutonium, and the attendant physical protection concerns.”
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management complexities of any such endeavor, the establishment of a joint 
venture or multinational R&D pyroprocessing facility might be a prudent first 
step. This option would have several advantages. First, it would help the United 
States maintain its position of opposing the spread of sensitive nuclear facilities 
because the ROK pyroprocessing facility would constitute an alternative to 
nationally controlled facilities.  Second, a plant with U.S. or multinational 
involvement could establish additional barriers, through greater transparency, to 
the diversion of nuclear materials to non-peaceful purposes and thus serve as an 
important complement to international safeguards and physical protection. Third, 
the presence of a multinational staff would place participants under a greater 
degree of scrutiny by partners and may also constitute an additional obstacle 
against a breakout by the ROK.  Finally, it offers a less discriminatory approach 
than a regime that allows a few states to continue their national programs while 
strongly discouraging most states from acquiring such technologies.
Whether such additional commitments and restrictions would be acceptable to the United 
States remains to be seen.  In evaluating these and possibly other options, the negotiators 
will face challenges in trying to design a new U.S.-ROK agreement that is tailored to the 
ROK program and simultaneously avoids setting a precedent for other states to acquire 
their own sensitive nuclear facilities. Regardless of whether South Korea accepts the 
once-through fuel cycle as the U.S. would prefer—or some form of pyroprocessing under 
enhanced safeguards and some form of joint or multinational control—the two countries 
need to resolve this issue in a way that will establish a positive model for reconciling the 
nuclear fuel cycle aspirations of an advanced nuclear power such as South Korea, with 
global concerns about the proliferation risks of reprocessing.
